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ABSTRACT 
The general objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the political process through the 
governing elites on democratic consolidation in Nigeria‟s fourth republic. The paper argued that 
successive governing elites in Nigeria assimilated the character and attributes of the colonial 
administrators by being predatory and exploitative, thus have failed to maintain any form of social 
contract with the Nigerian people through governance. With the adoption of secondary method of data 
collection and Elite theory as framework of analysis, the paper observed that the much expected 
democratic dividends are still lacking and the requirements for democratic consolidation are yet to be in 
place. The paper suggested that the governing elite must tackle multiple tasks of building consensus in the 
political process, reform institutions, govern with sufficient accountability and uphold constitutionalism. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Some scholars contend that democracy is a destination in the political process of nation-states. The 
process commences with the building of a strong state; progressing through internal security; law and 
order; and sense of nationalism. A strong proponent of this school is Narang (2002) who argued that it 
took some countries in Europe, several centuries to arrive at this point. Democracy (especially the 
Western variant) and its compliments: rule of law; separation of powers; and party system to mention but 
a few seem to be the vogue across the globe, particularly in post-colonial (African) states who are not 
careful in adapting same to their peculiar situations and cultural settings. 
There is a noticeable tendency to trace the performance of democracy as a form of government in 
Nigeria to the colonial trappings of the state, the nature and character of successive governing elites and 
their misrepresentation of the purpose of state machinery to the citizenry (Kukah in Nwankwor, 2004: 
313). The contributions of earlier theorists like Rousseau and Locke that governance is a contract between 
the governed and leaders seems irrelevant in the management of public affairs in Nigeria. This perhaps 
underscores the lack of appreciation of the purpose or essence of the state. However, in entrenched 
democratic systems where rulers are held accountable to the ruled through various political and 
institutional mechanisms which include competitive multi-party elections conducted at regular intervals, 
this dismal state of affairs can be redressed. Ogundiya and Baba (2007) resonate that participation and 
accountability as vital ingredients of democracy offer the requisite platforms to determining who governs 
and the demand for stewardship realizable through periodic elections. 
The political process in Nigeria under the current dispensation (Fourth Republic) may qualify as 
civilian rule, but will not pass the test of democratic rule. This is premised on the fact that political parties 
largely lack internal democracy in their operations (Onyishi, 2007 and Ikeanyibe, 2009), thus restraining 
inclusive-style of participation. The combination of weak institutions of governance and self-inflicted 
inhibitions of agents/officials of these institutions (judiciary, legislature and executive) conjointly render 
all forms of accountability a nullity. Based on this background, the paper seeks to appraise the role of 
governing elites in consolidating or entrenching democracy in Nigeria with a focus on the Fourth 
Republic (1999-2014). This paper comprises: Abstract; Introduction; Conceptual Discourse; Theoretical 
Framework; The Political Class and Democracy in the Fourth Republic; Conclusion and 
Recommendations. 
2 METHOD AND MATERIALS 
In the main, this study relied on secondary data based on textbooks, journals, newspapers and internet 
sources. The study also benefitted from participant observation based on the fact that the Researchers as 
citizens of Nigeria have been actively involved in the electoral and governing process as observers and 
through academic enquiry anchored on textual analysis to data. Asika (1991:17-18) reinforced the utility 
and relevance of participant observation to studies of this nature thus “there are some…situations where 
the…method of gathering information is for the person seeking the information to participate and 
observe”. These methods in combination with elite theory as framework of analysis informed the 
deductions, conclusion and recommendations of the paper. 
3 CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL DISCOURSE ON ELITE 
Elite connotes “a group of people regarded as the best in a particular society or organization” (Soanes, 
Hawker, Elliott, 2006: 288). It is deductible from the above that elites can be typologised as: Governing 
or Political; Business; Traditional; Religious; Intellectual and so on. The focus of this paper is on the 
governing or political elites. This class of elites is usually located within the political process of any 
nation-state and is responsible for managing the political and administrative affairs. It is predicated on this, 
that the discussion of this paper has its theoretical base laid in the elite theory. 
There are several versions of the elite theory ranging from that developed by Vilfredo Pareto and 
Gaetano Mosca to those of C.W. Mills, Floyd Hunter and Raymond Aron. A combination of these 
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versions of the theory will be utilised as framework of analysis. The elite theory was first developed by 
two Italian Sociologists namely: Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. The earlier versions of the theory 
emphasized personal attributes of leaders, which aided their hold or dominance in power positions. Later 
versions dwelt more on the institutional framework of society (Haralambos, 1999: 107). The thrust of the 
theory are as follows: 
i. Elite owes its power to its internal organisation and forms a united and cohesive minority 
in the face of an unorganised and fragmented mass. 
ii. Major decisions which affect society are taken by the elite, and these decisions usually 
reflect the interest of the elite rather than the wishes of the majority. 
iii. The mass of the population is largely controlled and manipulated by the elite, passively 
accepting the propaganda which justifies elite rule. 
iv. Major change in society occurs when one elite replaces another. Pareto refers to this as 
“circulation of elites” and he noted that “all elite tend to become decadent”. “They decay in 
quality and lose their vigour. They may become soft and ineffective with the pleasures of easy 
living and the privileges of power…” (Haralambos, 1999: 108). 
v. The rule by a minority is an inevitable feature of social life and that the ruling minority is 
superior to the mass of the population who lack capacity for self-government and require the 
leadership and guidance of an elite. Mosca (in Haralambos, 1999: 109) hinged his argument on a 
historical claim that in all societies, there is “a class that rules and a class that is ruled”. Mosca 
corroborated that “the first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, 
monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more 
numerous class is directed and controlled by the first”. 
vi. Pareto typified modern democracies as merely another form of elite domination. Mosca 
averred that democracy could be government of the people, “it might even be government for the 
people, but it could never be government by the people. Elite rule remained inevitable” 
(Haralambos, 1999: 109). 
In addition to the foregoing, C.W. Mills hypothesised that American society is dominated by a power 
elite of unprecedented power and unaccountability, free from popular control, pursues its own concern 
which are power and self-aggrandizement. Dahl in Haralambos (1999: 112) argued in reaction to C.W. 
Mills‟s hypothesis that if it can be shown that a fraction of the society has the power to take “decisions on 
taxation and expenditures, subsidies, welfare programmes, military policy and…overrule opposition to its 
policies, then the existence of a power elite will have been established”. Raymond Aron in his version on 
Communist societies added that the elite employ power primarily for self-enrichment and that the mass of 
the population is left without any means of defence against the elite. 
4 APPLICATION OF THEORY 
 The governing elite in Nigeria deriving from their social characteristics and privileges of office 
operate as a formidable team against the mass (people) who are encumbered by daily pressure for 
sustenance and necessities of life. The manipulative tendencies and tool by the elite inhibit any genuine 
effort to advance common cause in form of qualitative education, shelter, basic infrastructure and other 
social amenities as deliverables of democratic governance. Madunagu (2005: 1) validated this in his 
assertion that “the dominant fraction of the Nigerian ruling classes does not use the wealth they loot…for 
the benefit of „their people‟, although these poor people whose names are invoked in vain are often 
mobilized to fight their imaginary enemies”. 
 The reference to looting of the nation‟s wealth above reinforces the serial argument by scholars and 
public analysts/social commentators that the governing elites in Nigeria (past and present) are complicit in 
resource plunder, and as an extension of the colonial state, the post-colonial state represented by the 
governing elite is also predatory and exploitative. Additionally, Onyishi (2007: 197) documented that 
“…the post-colonial state never became a reflection of the contending social forces within society. This 
inorganic character of the emergent Nigerian state meant that it would…not encapsulate a social contract 
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between the citizens and…the government”. He corroborated that the emergent statesmen were 
apprenticed under the colonial administrators and required such anti-democratic traits as arrogance; 
exclusivity; elitism; executive authoritarianism, censorship of popular debate on public issues. 
Successive governing elites in Nigeria are not accountable to the citizenry. This is attributable to the 
fallen status of Nigerian laws and weak institutions of governance which ensures that the internal and 
external mechanisms for upholding public accountability are grossly circumscribed (Ibietan, 2013). 
Support for these averments hinges on various allegations of public treasury looting by public officials, 
Governors and local government chieftains to mention but a few. The institutions (CCB; EFCC; ICPC; 
Judiciary) saddled with the tasks of maintaining probity in office, moral rectitude in the conduct of 
government business and integrity in public affairs have not been able to do much due to the reasons 
adduced above. It is however doubtful if there is anything the defenseless mass of the population can do 
about this, in view of the instrument of coercion at the disposal of the elite. This validates Pareto‟s 
assertion that modern democracies are merely another form of elite domination. C.W. Mills‟s hypothesis 
on unaccountability, unprecedented use of power for selfish pursuit and personal aggrandizement are very 
apt as reflected in the foregoing analyses. 
The challenge of service delivery, infrastructural deficits and qualitative life for citizenry among others 
demonstrate that the expected democratic dividends have not been delivered. The governing elite in 
Nigeria may have become decadent and ineffective due to pleasures of easy living and privileges of 
power in the words of Pareto. ANEEJ (2004: 16) reinforced this issue while identifying the existence of a 
predatory state and elite in Nigeria, and submitted with finality that “this may therefore explain the lack of 
development in the country…”  
From independence to date, Nigeria has witnessed the “circulation of elites” as theorized by Pareto; 
this implies that one elite replaces another in order that major change in society can occur. It is however 
doubtful if major and qualitative changes had taken place to position the country in the big league in 
development terms. As 2015 elections beckon, it would be a matter of conjecture (which this paper is 
careful not to engage in) to evaluate what the All Progressives Congress (APC) or Peoples Democratic 
Party (PDP) or any other Party can do to alter for good, the seemingly dismal development outlook and 
performance of Nigeria. 
5 DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
There is a convergence of opinion by scholars and writers that Democracy as a concept in the Social 
Sciences is nebulous and its usage can sometimes be misplaced due to its immense “propaganda value” 
(Omeje, 2001; Sobowale, 2013). It is therefore not surprising that Oyovbaire in Obasi (2001:21) posited 
that “democracy has no settled meaning. It connotes image as well as reality of politics for different 
political systems, rulers, citizens, actors and scholars. As a theory of politics, it has had a turbulent 
history”. The historical nuances and landmarks of democracy are traceable to the Greeks, where it was 
practiced in its direct form, and as noted by Alapiki (2004: 50), it is “a situation where all the citizens 
took part in law making and policy formulation”. This is no longer practicable in contemporary situations 
with manifestly large population and wide geographical coverage. It is predicated on this that 
representative democracies in which people exercise governing power either directly or indirectly through 
representatives elected periodically by themselves (Ezeani, 2010: 114) has proved to be suitable. 
Gana in Ogundiya and Baba (2007: 245) opined that democracy is “a government by persons freely 
chosen by the governed who also hold them accountable and responsible for their actions while in 
government”. These authors inferred from the above definition that the two core ideas and ingredients 
underlying democracy are participation and accountability. A thorough scrutiny of the political process in 
Nigeria‟s fourth republic reveals that the governing elite have made caricature of these ingredients 
(participation and accountability). To be sure, elections which ordinarily should ensure, confirm or re-
affirm legitimacy of the elected in governance through regular consent, and also provide a virile platform 
for democracy to blossom has become grossly compromised. This position is buttressed by the works of a 
galaxy of authors, such as Onyishi, 2007; Ikeanyibe, 2009; and Sobowale, 2013. 
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In addition, democracy requires strong political culture and durable institutions to thrive. Curiously, 
the political process in the fourth republic is devoid of optimism as far as political culture and institutions 
of governance are concerned. It is on this reckoning that Onyishi (2007: 205) averred on a cautionary note 
that “…some basic institutional reforms are needed as a matter of urgency. The state of the following 
institutional guards of democracy needs to be tinkered with: election management organisation, the 
legislature, the judiciary, the police, the constitution, the civil society”. 
The observation made by Umezurike (2011: 37) that democracy has remained largely tenuous in 
Nigeria raises a fundamental poser on whether it is apt to discuss democratic consolidation in the context 
of its wobbling and fumbling experience. Rustow in Mclean and McMillan (2003: 145) may be right in 
his allusion to “transitions” and “consolidation” as vital factors in democratic stability. He corroborated 
that “attention must be given to political institutions and procedures (free and fair political participation 
and contestation, and wide protection of civil rights)”. 
Democratic consolidation connotes “the challenges of making new democracies secure by extending 
their life expectancy beyond the short-term and making them immune against the threat of authoritarian 
repression…” (Beetham in Ainabor, Idomeh and Braimoh, 2010: 17). This makes it clearer why Obasi 
(2001: 21) posited that “democracy is…the opposite of arbitrary, despotic or tyrannical rule”. The 
conditions for democratic consolidation are: popular legitimization; the diffusion of democratic values, 
the routinization of anti-system actors, civilian-military relations, party building, organization of 
functional interest, the stabilization of electoral rules, judicial reforms, alleviation of poverty and 
economic stabilization. 
The above requirements for democratic consolidation appear quite omnibus and converges with 
Onyishi‟s (2007) recommendations, and these explain why democratic consolidation looks like a 
tantalizing mirage or tall order in Nigeria‟s fourth republic. From the experience within the last fifteen 
years, perhaps it is safer to posit that Nigeria should sustain or stabilize civilian rule based on the 
foregoing narrative, rather than pointing to democratic consolidation. 
In a related discourse, Usman (2010) opined that transition to democratic rule is not an automatic 
guarantee for consolidation. He stretched the argument that democratic consolidation (process) requires 
redefinition of institutions and relations among political actors. There is therefore the tendency to 
associate consolidated democracies with their stability. This view agrees with Rustow in Mclean and 
McMillan (2003) that transitions and consolidation are common denominators in democratic stability. 
Ainabor et.al (2010: 18) building on Diamond (1995) conceptualized democratic consolidation as “the 
process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is 
unlikely to breakdown”.  
This implies that behaviour and institutional change normalize democratic politics and narrows its 
uncertainty. As a process, democratic consolidation is an amalgam of several factors or conditions (listed 
above) operating in a symbiotic manner. As a corollary, democratic consolidation calls for deliberate 
efforts by the governing elite and political class to adopt common interest in establishing and upholding 
electoral procedures, obeying electoral rules, avoiding destabilizing political conducts, entrenching robust 
conflict management mechanisms in the political process. The net effect is that democratic structures, 
institutions and processes are strengthened. A high degree of consensus building among political class 
tends to create peaceful political climate. This combined with transparent and accountable leadership plus 
people-centred (public) policy orientation, persuasively explains mass mobilization and galvanizes 
development via democratic dividends. 
The balance sheet or synopsis on this discourse based on foregoing evidence dictate that succour be 
drawn from Narang (2002: 377-378) that “…elected leaders must…tackle multiple tasks. They must build 
institutions, reform institutions and in some cases dismantle institutions… procedurally; they must govern 
with sufficient accountability and faithfulness to the law and constitution to enhance the legitimacy of the 
constitutional system…” These postulations offer enduring path to democratic consolidation which is 
feasible but quite herculean, and creates the necessary bulwark against democratic instability. The next 
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section of this paper discusses the activities of the political class and governing elites and the impact on 
democracy and democratic consolidation in Nigeria‟s fourth republic. 
6 THE POLITICAL CLASS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN THE 
FOURTH REPUBLIC 
At the re-emergence of democracy in 1999, public expectation from the democratic process was very 
high; this implies that the political class in Nigeria would come under public scrutiny in governance and 
to provide solutions to most of the nagging issues in the socio-economic and political arena. The political 
class whether elected or appointed, owe a duty to the citizenry to uphold the socio-economic 
objectives/directive principles of state and maintain rectitude in governance. Sadly, much of these have 
not been seen in the Fourth republic. It is even more disturbing that elections which could have served as 
platform to correct deviations and a veritable mechanism for the realization of the objectives of 
democratization have been reduced to a charade, thus, making democratic process/practice in Nigeria, a 
political liability, a source of multiple societal problems and decay (Ogundiya and Baba, 2007: 245).  
To be sure, electoral process in Nigeria since 1999, have been characterized by irregularities, 
brigandage, unrestrained violence, wanton destruction of lives and properties. In fact, electoral politics in 
Nigeria since 1999 raises grave concern, and as corroborated by Ibeanu (2007:295) “… elections failed 
woefully and those who conducted them set back the hands of the clock of democratic consolidation in 
Nigeria…” This state of affairs tends to position the country on the precipice for some years now. The 
past fifteen years have been characterized by tragic regression in some spheres of national life. Nigerians 
have indeed passed through harrowing times and watched their standards of living plummet drastically as 
successive Human Development reports show.  
The United Nations Development Programme‟s Human Development Report of 2004 ranked Nigeria 
as the 30
th
 poorest country in the world, and according to the Global Competitive Index (GCI, 2013-2014), 
Nigeria ranked as 120
th
 country among 148 countries in the world. The socio-economic and political 
characteristics of the country over these years include: persistent poverty; unemployment; poor economic 
management; widespread corruption; infrastructural deficits; low investor confidence;  debt overhang; 
inefficient public institutions; and lack of confidence in government (on the part of the governed). The 
antidote to these maladies inheres in good governance anchored on durable and sustainable democratic 
process and institutions. The governing elite and political class has tremendous roles to play in this regard 
and it stands to good reason that constitutionalism and viable political culture must constitute the fulcrum 
of democratic consolidation. 
It is obvious that the political party system within this period has failed to chart a course that could 
entrench genuine democracy. This position was taken further by Ikeanyibe (2009:70) while building on 
the works of other scholars that political parties, especially in Nigeria‟s fourth republic are “…lacking in 
organization, discipline focus or souls. Their membership is filled by corrupt, unpatriotic and 
undisciplined political elite that sees election more as an investment than a call to serve people.” The 
desperation of politicians to capture state power becomes clearer in the light of these averments.  
In a related discourse, Onyishi (2007:199) was more pungent in positing that the inordinate quest to 
acquire and retain state power implies the deployment of “…resources of the state in the … struggle to 
retain it.” He submitted further that they “block every democratic tendency… (and) continue to use all 
kinds of means to capture state power in order to protect themselves against the vagaries of politics.” 
These expositions present cogent explanations on the palpable nature of democratic experience in 
Nigeria‟s fourth republic. This is exacerbated by lack of ideology, values and internal democracy within 
and among political parties. It is axiomatic and revealing that credible and robust opposition politics 
anchored on democratic tenets have been quite elusive within this period, and this was typified 
pejoratively by Ikeanyibe (2009:60) as “the irony of one-party state in a multiparty system.” 
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7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper examined the role of governing elite and impact of the political process on democratic 
consolidation in Nigeria‟s fourth republic. From the foregoing, it is deductible that there has been massive 
rape and assault on democratic process and practice due to the avalanche of factors discussed in the paper. 
The political class and the governing elite have not sufficiently aligned themselves with the required 
democratic values and ethos, by being sportsmanly in electoral process and this seems to give an 
impression that they are far from being altruistic. The serious business of governance have been reduced 
to a huge joke, because the average Nigerian who is supposed to be the subject of development is not in 
the permutation and daily actions of the governing elite, such that the standard of living of the masses 
have shown deceleration in relative terms to the period before the fourth republic. 
The elite theory as framework of analysis utilized in this paper has proved useful in exposing the 
characteristics and trappings of governing elite and political class. It highlighted elite complicity in 
resource mismanagement and dysfunctional approach to governance occasioned by avarice and rapacious 
inclinations which partly account for Nigeria‟s developmental challenges. 
One major suggestion to arrest the dismal state of affairs discussed above is attitudinal reorientation 
among the governing elite to encapsulate codes of conduct and selflessness in public office. This has the 
advantage of changing the lack of social contract between the elite and the governed, such that the much 
desired dividends of democracy could be delivered to the populace. 
Robust political culture with positive effect on vital institutions such as the judiciary, legislature, 
electoral body (INEC) and civil society (among others) is urgently canvassed. This has the tendency to 
deepen democratic process and practice. 
As a corollary to the above, there is the need to cultivate a collaborative approach between the public, 
government and political parties to galvanise civic engagement and commitment to the ideals and tenets 
of democracy. This is partly achievable via improvement in public consciousness anchored on advocacy 
and targeted at credible cum transparent electoral process that entrenches orderly voting, ballot 
monitoring and protection. 
The mechanisms and institutions responsible for maintaining public accountability should be 
invigorated; this is with a view to plugging the perforation of public wealth and resources. The anti-graft 
campaign and drive should be resuscitated and given serious bite in order to halt the kleptomania 
tendencies of the political class/governing elite. 
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